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Thar “SHE” blows?  
Gender, Competition, and Bubbles in Experimental Asset 
Markets 
By CATHERINE C. ECKEL AND SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN * 
Do women and men behave differently in financial asset markets? 
Our results from an asset market experiment using the Smith, 
Suchaneck, and Williams (1988) framework show marked gender 
difference in producing speculative price bubbles. Using 35 markets 
from different studies, a meta-analysis confirms the inverse 
relationship between the magnitude of price bubbles and the 
frequency of female traders in the market. Women’s price forecasts 
also are much lower, even in the first period.  Additional analysis 
shows the results are not due to differences in risk aversion, 
personality, or math skills.  Implications for financial markets and 
experimental methodology are discussed.   
JEL codes:  C91, G02, G11, J16 
Key words:  Asset market, bubble, experiment, gender  
 
 
 
 
 
Eckel: Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843-4228 (ceckel@tamu.edu); 
Füllbrunn: Radboud University Nijmegen, Department of Economics, Thomas van Aquinostraat 5.1.15, 6525 GD 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands (s.fullbrunn@fm.ru.nl).  We thank participants at the ESA World Meeting in Chicago 2011, 
ESA European Conference Luxembourg 2011, Experimental Finance 2011 in Innsbruck, 6th Nordic Conference on 
Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2011 in Lund, and the ESA Northern Meeting in Tucson 2011 for helpful 
comments. Thanks also to Malcolm Kass and Ericka Scherenberg-Farrett for research assistance. Funding was provided by 
the Negotiations Center and the Center for Behavioral and Experimental Economic Science at the University of Texas at 
Dallas. Füllbrunn was supported by the National Research Fund, Luxembourg (PDR 09 044). 
  
2 
 
“With more women on the trading floor, risk-taking would be a saner business.”  
The New York Times (Sept. 30, 2008). 
 
The financial crisis had – and still has – tremendous consequences for economies 
all over the world. The housing market bubble finally burst, leading to a sharp decrease in 
asset value with negative externalities on the entire worldwide banking system. Reasons 
for the occurrence of the bubble such as excessive risk taking, new financial instruments 
(CDO, CDS) or lax regulations have been discussed. The New York Times article 
referenced above claims the more obvious culprit of the financial crises in 2008 to be 
men. Like the Gordon Gekko “Greed is Good” stereotype of a Wall Street trader, men in 
financial markets neglect the human element, to take irresponsible risks, and to compete 
with other ‘alpha dogs’ in cut-throat competition. The article suggests an influx of 
talented women on the trading floor could reduce aggressive risk taking and, thus, serve 
to calm down markets and limit the emergence of speculative price bubbles. But do 
women and men behave differently in financial asset markets? 
  Empirical studies report gender differences in financial decision making. Women 
investors tend to invest more often in risk-free assets (Hariharan et al. 2000), choose less 
risky investment portfolios (Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998), and have a lower 
propensity towards financial risk than men (Barsky et al., 1997). Men trade more 
frequently, and earn lower portfolio returns as a result (Barber and Odean 2001). This 
behavior is sometimes attributed to the greater overconfidence of men (e.g. Barber and 
Odean 2001), but not all studies confirm this pattern (Beckman and Menkoff 2008). 
Differences are also found between men and women finance professionals.  Women fund 
managers in the US are found to be more risk averse, to follow less extreme investment 
strategies, and to trade less often, but their performance does not differ significantly from 
men (Niessen and Ruenzi 2007).  Atkinson et al. (2003) find that women brokers do not 
choose more risk-averse portfolios for their clients than their male counterparts, though 
the flow of investment moneys to female-managed funds is lower. Consistent with those 
results, Madden (2012) shows that women brokers receive lower-quality account 
referrals, but that performance is no different conditional on the quality of transferred 
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accounts.  Some evidence suggests that women brokers may outperform their male 
counterparts (Kim 1997).  A recent survey by Rothstein Kass (2013) reports that women-
managed hedge funds hold more conservative portfolios and outperform the industry 
average.    
A shortcoming of empirical studies of gender differences in financial markets 
cannot avoid the fact that female traders reach their positions only at the end of a lengthy 
selection process, which is largely controlled by men.  Trading is a male dominated 
environment and its culture involves a lot of machismo (Roth 2006).  Given these women 
acquired male related attributes to survive in this environment, empirical results on 
gender differences in financial markets may be biased. Thus, we make use of 
experimental methods to uncover gender differences in financial markets. Our subjects 
are recruited from the general student body, and so avoid any biases that might affect the 
selection of male and female traders.   
Recent laboratory experiments consider gender differences in several decision 
making settings. Relevant for trading in asset markets, two main effects have been 
established across several environments: women are more risk averse than men, and 
women appear to dislike competitive environments and react negatively to competitive 
pressures.  Comparing data across abstract gambles, contextual experiments and field 
studies, Eckel and Grossman (2008c) note that many studies find no gender difference in 
risk taking but when a significant difference is found it is nearly always that women are 
more risk averse. A meta-analysis of 150 studies finds a significant difference in the risk 
attitudes of men and women (Byrnes et al. 1999), with women preferring less risk. In 
general, men are greater risk takers, although the gender difference varies with the risky 
environment. The difference seems also greater among older participants. Croson and 
Gneezy (2009) also infer from their survey of risk-aversion experiments that women are 
more risk averse than men in most tasks and most populations.  
Beginning with Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), a number of articles 
confirm the differential effect of competition on the performance of women and men: 
while competitive situations improve effort levels and performance for men they leave 
the performance of women unchanged.  Furthermore, given the choice, women avoid 
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competitive environments, while men choose to compete even when they are likely to 
lose (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; see Croson and Gneezy 2009 for a survey).  
The reported gender differences in the experimental literature suggest that women 
traders in asset markets will be less willing to take risks, and that they will avoid 
engaging in aggressive competition with other traders. However, these conclusions are 
based on individual decisions or winner-take-all tournaments, but not on environments 
where trading takes place. Some studies on experimental asset markets infer gender 
differences from their data. In a study relating individual risk attitudes to market 
behavior, Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) find women submit fewer offers and engage in 
fewer trades than men.  In an asset market with short-lived assets, Deaves, Lüders, and 
Luo (2009) find no gender effect in trading among students in Canada, but observe that 
women trade less than men in Germany.1  
To our knowledge, ours is the first study that is designed explicitly to test for 
gender differences in experimental markets for long-lived assets. We employ the most 
commonly-used experimental asset market design from Smith, Suchaneck, and Williams 
(1988). The key finding in studies based on this design is that prices exceed fundamental 
value and produce a bubble pattern.  In a typical session, prices start below fundamental 
value, increase far above fundamental value and crash before maturity. This bubble 
pattern has been replicated in numerous studies. Find a discussion about the experimental 
design and a survey on findings in Palan (2013). We manipulate the experimental design 
in that we invite either only women or only men to a market session.  
From the literature on gender differences in risk taking and competition we derive 
our main hypothesis that all-male markets will generate higher speculative bubbles than 
all-female markets. The experimental results support our hypothesis, and show that all-
female markets not only generate smaller bubbles than all-male markets, but in some 
cases generate ‘negative’ bubbles – that is, prices substantially below fundamental value. 
 
1
 The way the study is constructed may have confounded gender effects.    
2
 We sent emails to all authors using the Smith et al. (1988) asset market design and made an announcement at the 
European Science Association discussion forum. Unfortunately, many researchers stated that data on the gender of 
participants was not collected in their experiments. All sessions have the same dividend process and 15 periods. In Cheung, 
Hedegaard, and Palan (2011) ten subjects participated in the markets, in sessions 56 and 57 of Haruvy, Noussair, and 
Powell (2011) eight subjects, and in session 6 of Powell (2011) seven subjects. 
3
 Find bubble measures for each session implemented in the meta- analysis in the appendix. 
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Since these results are remarkably strong, we also conduct a meta-analysis with 35 
markets from different experimental studies. We find a substantial correlation between 
the fraction of women in the market and the magnitude of observed price bubbles. These 
results support the hypothesis that increasing the number of women in the market reduces 
overpricing. These results suggest that the statement from The New York Times contains 
an element of truth.  
I. Asset Market Design 
Each session is a market with a parametric structure that is identical to that of 
“design 4” described in Smith et al. (1988). Nine traders trade 18 assets during a 
sequence of 15 double-auction trading periods, each lasting four minutes.  At the end of 
every period, each share pays a dividend that is 0, 8, 28, or 60 francs with equal 
probability. Since the expected dividend equals 24 francs in every period, the 
fundamental value in period t equals 24*(16 – t), i.e. 360 in period 1, 336 in period 2, ... 
and 24 in period 15. Traders are endowed with shares and cash before the first period. 
Three subjects receive three shares and 225 francs, three subjects receive two shares and 
585 francs, and the remaining three subjects receive one share and 945 francs. The 
exchange rate is one cent to one franc. The treatment variable is gender. In six sessions, 
the “all-female markets,” only women were invited to participate, and in the other six 
sessions, the “all-male markets,” only men were invited to participate.  
Experiments were conducted at the Center for Behavioral and Experimental 
Economic Science at University of Texas at Dallas. Subjects were recruited using 
ORSEE (Greiner 2004). The experiments were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher 
2007). Since we ran 12 sessions with 9 subjects each, 108 subjects participated. 
Instructions – taken basically from Haruvy and Noussair (2006) and Haruvy et al. (2007) 
– were read aloud and subjects practiced the double auction facility in a training phase. 
Instructions can be found in the Appendix. 
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II. Analysis of gender effects on asset market pricing  
A. Gender effects in our experiment 
Figure 1 depicts the time series of median prices from individual markets (grey 
lines) and average of median session prices (bold line with diamonds), by period, for all-
female markets (left) and all-male markets (right). The bold diagonal line is the 
fundamental value (FV), which declines over time. The figure indicates that price levels 
are higher in all-male sessions than in all-female sessions, though neither tracks the 
fundamental value. In all-male markets, prices substantially exceed fundamental value in 
most of the periods, while in all-female markets, prices are below fundamental value in 
more than half of the periods.  
 
ALL-FEMALE MARKETS ALL-MALE MARKETS 
  
FIGURE 1. TIME SERIES OF MEDIAN TRANSACTION PRICES 
Notes: Median prices of individual markets (grey lines) as a function of period, fundamental value (FV, bold line) and average 
of median session prices (bold line with diamonds).  
 
To measure treatment differences, we make use of established bubble measures 
(see Haruvy and Noussair 2006). Table 1 shows these bubble measures for every session, 
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as well as male and female averages. Average Bias is the average of the per-period 
deviation of the median price from the fundamental value and serves as a measure of 
overpricing. A positive (negative) Average Bias indicates prices to be above (below) 
fundamental value. A small magnitude of the Average Bias indicates prices to be close to 
fundamental value. Total Dispersion is defined as the sum, over all 15 periods, of the 
absolute per-period deviation of the median price from the fundamental value, and serves 
as a measure of mispricing. This measure indicates the variability of prices in comparison 
to the fundamental value. A small (large) magnitude of Total Dispersion indicates a small 
(large) overall distance from the fundamental value. For reasons explained below, we 
also introduce Positive Deviation and Negative Deviation. We define Positive (Negative) 
Deviation as the sum, over all 15 periods, of the absolute per-period deviation of the 
median price from the fundamental value if prices are above (below) fundamental value. 
We also counted the greatest number of consecutive periods above fundamental value 
(Boom Duration) and the greatest number of consecutive periods below fundamental 
value (Bust Duration). Finally, turnover is the standardized measure of the amount of 
trading activity and defined as the sum of all transactions divided by the number of shares 
in the market.  
A bubble is characterized as the positive deviation of prices from fundamental 
value. Thus, a positive Average Bias, high Total Dispersion, a long Boom Duration and a 
short Bust Duration are indicators of a price bubble. In the following, we compare 
treatments by using several bubble measures as relevant units of interest. Since each 
session is an independent observation, we take six observations from each treatment to 
run Mann Whitney tests comparing measures between treatments and to run Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank tests comparing measures to benchmarks.  
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Table 1 — Observed Value of Bubble Measures  
                                                                  
Session 
ID Treatment 
Average 
Bias 
Total 
Dispersion 
Positive 
Deviation 
Negative 
Deviation 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration Turnover 
         
average all-female -25.71 1668 641 1027 6.67 7.83 14.28 
1 all-female -47.77 1583 433 1150 6 9 11.28 
2 all-female 26.20 1536 965 572 10 5 12.89 
3 all-female -75.90 1277 69 1208 4 9 9.94 
4 all-female 6.67 2586 1343 1243 7 8 20.72 
5 all-female -21.70 1854 764 1090 7 8 19.72 
6 all-female -41.73 1173 274 900 6 8 11.11 
         
average all-male 74.12 1854 1483 371 10.67 4.00 9.77 
1 all-male 99.17 1698 1593 105 14 1 10.78 
2 all-male 131.00 2602 2284 319 12 3 8.39 
3 all-male 15.20 1115 672 444 8 7 11.56 
4 all-male 50.27 2310 1532 778 9 6 9.83 
5 all-male 110.83 1933 1798 135 13 2 8.11 
6 all-male 38.27 1464 1019 445 8 5 9.94 
         
Two-
sided 
Mann-
Whitney 
p-value 0.007 0.522 0.025 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.030 
         
Notes: This table reports the observed values of various measures of the magnitude of bubbles for each session. 
Average Bias = ∑ (Pt – FVt)/15 where Pt and FVt equal median price and fundamental value in period t, 
respectively. Total Dispersion = ∑| Pt – FVt |. Positive Deviation = ∑| Pt – FVt | where Pt > FVt and Negative 
Deviation = ∑| Pt – FVt | where Pt < FVt. The boom and bust durations are the greatest number of consecutive 
periods that median transaction prices are above and below fundamental values, respectively. Turnover = ∑ Qt 
/18 where Qt equals the number of transactions in period t. The last row shows the p-value from a two-sided 
Mann Whitney U-Test comparing all-male and all-female sessions. 
 
 
Observation 1: In all-male markets, bubbles occur. In all-female markets, bubbles 
do not occur. 
 
Support: The treatment average of Average Bias equals 74.12 in all-male markets 
and is positive in each session, and equals -25.71 in all-female markets and is positive in 
two and negative in four sessions. Using a one-sided Wilcoxon-signed rank test, we can 
reject the null hypothesis that Average Bias equals or is lower than zero in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that Average Bias exceeds zero in the all-male markets (p = 0.014) 
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but not in the all-female markets (p = 0.915). Average Boom Duration in all-male 
markets exceeds 10 periods, and in all sessions prices are consistently above fundamental 
value in at least half of the share’s lifetime. Boom Duration exceeds Bust Duration in all 
sessions. Average Boom Duration in all-female markets is below 7 periods and in only 
one session are prices consistently above fundamental value more than half of the share’s 
lifetime. Here, Boom Duration exceeds Bust Duration in only one session.  
 
Observation 2: Bubbles in all-female markets are smaller than in all-male markets. 
 
Support: To illustrate the differences consider figure 2. The figure depicts Average 
Bias and Total Dispersion for each session. Going from left to right, Total Dispersion 
(mispricing) increases, and going from bottom to top, Average Bias (overpricing) 
increases. A session with a very large bubble would be located at the top right; trading at 
fundamental value would be located in the middle left. The figure shows that treatments 
do not differ so much in mispricing but rather in overpricing. Most of the diamonds, 
representing all-male sessions are above and to the right of the triangles, representing all-
female sessions. Thus, the figure indicates a treatment effect in Average Bias rather than 
in Total Dispersion.  
 
FIGURE 2. BUBBLE MEASURES ACROSS TREATMENTS 
Notes: Each diamond/triangle indicates the Average Bias – Total Dispersion combination of a session. A session with a very 
large bubble would be located at the top right. 
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Using a Mann Whitney U-test, we find Average Bias in all-male markets to 
significantly exceed Average Bias in all-female markets (p = 0.007). Recent experimental 
studies use Total Dispersion as a (positive) bubble measure. This is a good measure only 
when mispricing is due to prices that are above fundamental value in both treatments. 
Thus we find no significant treatment difference in Total Dispersion, which indicates that 
the overall mispricing is not different across gender (p-value = 0.522). Figure 1, however, 
suggests that prices negatively deviate from fundamental value in the all-female sessions, 
disqualifying Total Dispersion as a relevant bubble measure to compare treatments. Thus, 
we introduce the Positive Deviation from fundamental value as the relevant unit of 
interest. The treatment average is 1483 in all-male markets and 641 in all-female markets. 
Using a two-tailed Mann Whitney U-Test, we can reject the hypothesis of equal Positive 
Deviation (p = 0.025) indicating that all-male markets have higher Positive Deviation 
than all-female markets. Also the duration measures support observation 2. Using a two-
tailed Mann Whitney U-Test, we can reject the hypothesis of equal Boom Duration (p = 
0.016) and we can reject the hypothesis of equal Bust Duration (p-value = 0.012). All-
male markets exhibit a significantly higher Boom Duration and a significantly lower Bust 
Duration. 
 
Observation 3: Bubbles in some all-female markets are “negative”. 
 
Support: Average Bias is negative in four out of six all-female markets. Using a 
one-sided Wilcoxon-signed rank test, we can reject the null hypothesis that Average Bias 
equals or is above zero in favor of the alternative hypothesis that Average Bias is below 
zero in all-female markets at a 10% significance level (p = 0.084). Average Bust 
Duration in all-female markets equals about 8 periods, and prices are consistently below 
fundamental value in at least half of the share’s lifetime in all but one session. Bust 
Duration exceeds Boom Duration in all but one session.   
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To consider trading effects, we calculate the Turnover for every session, which is a 
normalized measure of trading activity defined as Turnover = (number of trades)/(number 
of shares available). A high turnover supposed to be positively related to price bubbles – 
that is, more trading occurs in sessions with bubbles. However, this relationship seems to 
be due to mispricing in general rather than to positive price deviations only. We find the 
spearman rank correlation coefficient to be positive for Average Bias and Positive 
Deviation in the all-males markets (0.771, 0.943) and a negative in the all-female markets 
(-0.771, -0.771). Thus, the higher the deviation from the fundamental value, the higher 
the turnover. Table 1 shows that the median Turnover in the all-female markets equals 14 
while it equals 10 in the all-male markets. Using a two-tailed Mann Whitney U-Test, we 
can reject the hypothesis of equal Turnover (p = 0.030). These results are different from 
observational studies: Field data show that men trade more than women in financial 
markets (e.g. Barber and Odean 2001), but recent experimental data show either no 
gender differences in trading (Deaves et al. 2009) or that the frequency of women in the 
market is positively correlated with turnover (Robin, Strážnická, and Villeval 2010). We 
can conclude that positive price bubbles are not the result of “excessive” trading on the 
part of men, since turnover is even higher for women.  However, it turns out that the 
gender difference in turnover is based on early trading periods. Running the Mann 
Whitney U-test in every period using volume as the relevant unit of observation, we find 
a significant difference only in period 1 (p = 0.007), but in neither period thereafter.   
Thus, women tend to trade more in early periods at prices well below fundamental value. 
Perhaps the high trading turnover for the early periods of the all-female sessions is the 
result of women desiring to lower the proportion of risky assets in their portfolios in 
favor of cash, and after an initial flurry of trades in which the assets are heavily 
discounted relative to fundamental value, further trades are unnecessary.   
B. A meta-analysis of gender and price bubbles 
Our results suggest a gender effect on pricing financial assets. However, same-
gender groups may lead to results qualitatively different from what is seen in the 
aggregate with mixed-gender pairings or groups (e.g., Charness and Rustichini 2011; 
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Eckel and Grossman 2008a survey gender composition in cooperation games). To see 
whether the gender effect persists in mixed-markets we consider the following hypothesis 
 
HYPOTHESIS: In experimental asset markets a higher frequency of female 
participants in the market decreases the bubble magnitude. 
 
We run a meta-analysis with 35 markets from labs in Magdeburg, Bonn, Tilburg 
and Copenhagen, using the same parameterization as in Smith et al. (1988).2 We were 
able to obtain data on gender composition (fraction of women in market) and median 
period prices from these 35 sessions.3 We apply a spearman rank correlation between the 
fraction of women in the market and bubble measures. Spearman’s rho equals -0.477 (p = 
0.004) for Average Bias, -0.351 (p = 0.039) for Positive Deviation, -0.390 (p = 0.021) for 
Boom Duration and 0.529 (p = 0.001) for Bust Duration. Since the p-values reject the 
hypothesis that variables are independent, the correlations show a significant effect that 
supports hypothesis 1.4 We also see that the bubble measures of the 35 markets fall 
between the values for our all-female and all-male markets. Using a Jonckheere-Terpstra-
Test and defining classes to be 1 for all-female markets, 2 for the 35 mixed gender 
markets and 3 for the all-male markets, we test the null hypothesis that the distribution of 
the bubble measure of interest does not differ among classes. We can reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of an increasing trend for Average Bias (p = 0.004), Positive 
Deviation (p = 0.051), Boom Duration (p = 0.039) and a decreasing trend for Bust 
Duration (p = 0.027). The analysis provides some evidence that gender composition has 
an impact on price bubbles in the Smith et al. (1988) asset market design. 
 
2
 We sent emails to all authors using the Smith et al. (1988) asset market design and made an announcement at the 
European Science Association discussion forum. Unfortunately, many researchers stated that data on the gender of 
participants was not collected in their experiments. All sessions have the same dividend process and 15 periods. In Cheung, 
Hedegaard, and Palan (2011) ten subjects participated in the markets, in sessions 56 and 57 of Haruvy, Noussair, and 
Powell (2011) eight subjects, and in session 6 of Powell (2011) seven subjects. 
3
 Find bubble measures for each session implemented in the meta- analysis in the appendix. 
4
 Note we do not include markets from our study in the Meta-Analysis. 
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III. Elicitation of individual measures and forecasts 
We now turn to an analysis of individual differences in subjects across sessions.  
We consider price forecasts, risk-aversion measured by an incentivized task, math ability, 
and survey measures of personality in an attempt to better understand gender differences 
in these markets.  Cross-session heterogeneity in the characteristics of the participants 
can help us to understand the sources of gender differences.   
The data show considerable gender differences in price forecasts.  Before each 
period, subjects were asked to forecast average period prices for all remaining periods, 
using the rules and the incentive scheme of Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007). For 
example, before period 1 each subject was required to submit 15 predictions, one 
prediction for each of the prices in periods 1 to period 15. Each participant received a 
payment for accuracy. The closer the prediction was to the actual average market price, 
the higher the payment. We implemented this element of the design to see whether price 
predictions can account for the differences in behavior between genders.  
To compare treatments, we calculate the Average Bias with predicted prices 
instead of median prices for all remaining periods for each subject.5 The average measure 
is lower for women than for men in every period. Using a simple t-Test with 108 
observations, we find no significant difference in Average Bias in early periods (Period 1- 
3) or in late periods (Period 14, 15), but in all periods in between at a significance level of 
5%. Note, however, that the all-male sessions generate higher prices from the initial 
period, and so men observe higher prices, which then influence their predictions of future 
prices. In the forecast preceding the first trading period in which no price anchor disturbs 
the prediction, women on average predict period-one-prices to be about 105 francs while 
men predict them to be at about 205 francs. This difference is significant using a t-Test 
with 108 observations (p = 0.010). Men’s predictions for period two prices also exceed 
women’s predictions (p = 0.020). Prediction for later periods, however, put in perspective 
the gender differences in price predictions. Overall, we conclude that women tend to 
expect lower prices than men from the beginning. However, none of the participants 
 
5
 This is the average of predicted period prices minus fundamental value in all remaining periods. 
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expect prices to have a bubble pattern and only one subject expected prices to track 
fundamental value.6 
To measure the subject’s attitude toward risk, each subject participated in an 
incentivized gamble-choice task (Eckel and Grossman 2008b). Prior to the asset market, 
subjects were asked to choose their most-preferred lottery from six ranked lottery 
options.  Each 50/50 lottery involved a high and low possible outcome, as follows: option 
1 = {$12.00, $12.00}; option 2 {$8.00, $20.00}; option 3 {$ 4.00, $28.00}; option 4 
{$0.00, $36.00}; option 5 {$-4.00, $ 44.00}; option 6 {-$8.00, $ 48.00}.  The lottery was 
played out, using a six-sided die, after the asset market was completed. Therefore 
subjects did not receive any feedback on the outcome of the lottery until the end of the 
session.   
Note that these lotteries range from a certain outcome of $12, and increase in 
expected value and variance through option 5; option 6 consists of an increase in variance 
from option 5, with the same expected value.  Thus choosing option 1 indicates extremely 
high risk aversion, and only subjects who are risk-lovers should prefer option 6.  We code 
the decisions as the option number, 1 – 6, reflecting the lottery selected, and this provides 
an index of risk aversion.7  While the women’s average lottery choice equals 3.05, the 
men’s average equals 3.94.8 Using a two-sided Mann Whitney U-test with 54 
observations in each treatment, we find men to choose lotteries indicating less risk 
aversion than women (p = 0.003). Comparing on session level, the highest session 
average in the all-female markets is lower than the lowest session average in the all-male 
markets.  
 
6
 This is in line with observations form Haruvy et al. (2007) in which subjects start to predict bubbles after 
gaining experience. 
7
 Under the assumption of a CRRA utility function, each possible choice defines a range of coefficients of relative 
risk aversion.  Using the midpoint of the ranges, substituting the average of these coefficients for the average gamble 
number for each session does not alter results.  See Eckel and Grossman 2008b for further details.  Note the measure used 
in the present paper adds one additional gamble, Gamble 6, to the protocol used in Eckel and Grossman 2008b.   
8
 On average the results do not substantially vary from Eckel and Grossman (2008b), where the average of 138 
males is 3.79 and the average of 120 females is 3.08. 
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Subjects also completed a simple math test, which was not incentivized.9 The 
average frequency of correct answers in all-female markets was 74% and in all-male 
market was 85%. Using a t-Test with 54 observations in each treatment, we find that 
women solve fewer tasks on average than men (p = 0.010). 
Running a OLS regression using Average Bias as dependent variable and a dummy 
variable to indicate gender (male = 1), the average of chosen lottery options (Lottery 
Option) and the frequency of solved math tasks (Math) as independent variables, we find 
the male dummy to remain significantly different, indicating a persistent gender effect on 
the bubble magnitude.10  
 
TABLE 2. OLS REGRESSION ON AVERAGE BIAS 
 
Male Dummy 155.1*** 96.04** 145.9*** 
 
(36.62) (35.85) (41.31) 
Lottery Option 62.16* 
 
66.53* 
 
(33.24) 
 
(35.39) 
Math 
 
-34.09 -117.6 
  
(227.1) (205.5) 
Constant -270.9* 3.334 -188.0 
 
(132.0) (194.3) (199.6) 
    Observations 12 12 12 
R-squared 0.734 0.631 0.744 
 
Notes: Dependent Variable is Average Bias. Independent variables are Male Dummy = 1 if 
all-male market, Lottery Option = average gamble choice with 1 = riskless choice and 6 = 
high risk choice (see Eckel and Grossmann 2008b), and Math = Frequency of solved math 
tasks. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Finally, to see whether personality traits play a role we make use of personality 
measures from Carver and White (1994) to see whether behavior in markets is related to 
 
9
 Subjects solved the following tasks: 1) Phone plan A costs $30 per month and 10 cents per minute. Phone plan B 
costs $20 per month and 15 cents per minute. How many minutes makes plan A cost the same as plan B?; 2) Multiply 43 
and 29; 3) Solve the equation for a: X6/X2 = Xa; 4) Complete the following statement: As X gets larger and larger, the 
expression 3-(1/X) gets closer and closer to…; 5) Suppose 20,000 people live in a city. If six percent of them are sick, how 
many people are sick?; 6) 80 is 20 percent of… 
10
 Using tobit regressions with Boom Duration and Bust Duration as dependent variables leads qualitatively to the 
same results.  Running similar regressions but with individual data (n=108) also yields the same qualitative results.   
16 
 
BIS and BAS.11 Therefore, we elicited the following measures; anxiety (BIS), and fun 
seeking (BAS), drive (BAS), and reward-responsiveness (BAS). Subjects also complete a 
survey measure of Type A personality (see Friedman 1996). However, we find no 
differences in BIS/BAS or Type A personality between genders using a Mann Whitney 
U-test (all p-values > 0.2) comparing all subjects (n = 54 in each treatment) or session 
averages (n = 6 in all treatments), and including them in the regression analysis above 
does not change the results. 
We conclude from this analysis that, while risk aversion plays a relatively weak 
role in the price differences across sessions, other individual differences seem not to be 
responsible for gender differences in the production of bubbles in asset market 
experiments.   
IV. Conclusion and Discussion 
This is the first study that systematically tests for gender effects in experimental 
asset markets with long-lived assets. Comparing all-male and all-female markets, we find 
a significant gender effect in that all-male markets show significant price bubbles while 
all-female markets produce prices that are below fundamental value. Women’s price 
expectations are consistent with this pattern of behavior: from the very first period, 
women’s expectations are substantially below that of men.  Risk attitudes seem to have 
some impact on forming bubbles. Using a Meta-Analysis on 35 markets from different 
studies using the Smith, Suchaneck, and Williams (1988) asset market design, we find a 
relationship between gender composition and price bubbles, in that a higher frequency of 
women in the market reduces the magnitude of a price bubble. This may explain part of 
the large heterogeneity of price bubbles within treatments in experimental studies.  
These results imply that financial markets might indeed operate differently if they 
were run by women. It became a popular mantra in the wake of the collapse of the 
 
11
 Gray’s behavioral inhibition and activation system postulates two dimension of personality, anxiety proneness 
and impulsivity (see Carver and White 1994). The first regulates aversive motivation (behavioral inhabitation system, BIS) 
and the latter regulates appetitive motivation (behavioral activation system, BAS). Activation of BIS causes inhabitation of 
movement towards goals and is correlated with feelings such as fear, anxiety, frustration, and sadness. Activation of BAS, 
however, causes the person to begin movement toward goals and is correlated with feelings such as hope, elation, and 
happiness. The questions for these measures can be received upon request. 
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housing bubble in 2008, that men’s competitive nature and overconfidence were 
responsible for the crash.  Indeed women are relatively scarce in the fields of investment 
and corporate finance, representing only about 10% of Wall Street traders. Our data 
suggest that increasing the proportion of women traders might have a dampening effect 
on the likelihood and magnitude of bubbles.   
Why are women so scarce in these fields, anecdotally known for machismo and 
hyper-competitive work cultures?  This characterization is supported by a history of 
spectacular employment discrimination lawsuits, including the $150 million settlement of 
the so-called “boom boom room” lawsuit in the 1990s.  The ‘bonus system’ of 
compensation in Wall Street firms, where workers earn large bonuses based on their 
relative performance, also fosters competition.  Experimental research clearly establishes 
women’s preference for non-competitive environments (see survey in Croson and Gneezy 
2009).  In addition, Wall Street culture has led to a lack of family-friendly policies that 
women tend to value – or an unwillingness to use such policies even if they are in place. 
Since workers are expected to put the job first and work extremely long hours, taking 
family leave or negotiating for fewer work hours has negative effects on perceptions of a 
worker’s quality, and therefore on their bonus (Roth 2006).  The cultural setting no doubt 
plays an important role in discouraging women from employment in these sectors, apart 
from any possible direct discrimination in hiring by employers.  
Finally, our results suggest a cautionary note with respect to financial market 
experiments. We urge researchers studying financial markets to take gender composition 
into consideration before running experiments to avoid undesired variance. This is 
especially relevant when using laboratory asset markets as test beds for exploring market 
institutions
18 
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Appendix I 
BUBBLE MEASURES FOR META-ANALYSIS 
Treatment Session Fraction Women 
Average 
Bias 
Positive  
Deviation 
Boom 
Duration 
Bust 
Duration 
       Füllbrunn/Neugebauer 2012  Equity MD 1 0.67 19.27 745 11 4 
Füllbrunn/Neugebauer 2012  Equity MD 2 0.33 -2.30 396 10 5 
Füllbrunn/Neugebauer 2012 Equity MD 3 0.56 6.77 338 9 2 
Füllbrunn/Neugebauer 2012 Equity BN 1 0.33 104.80 1685 13 1 
Füllbrunn/Neugebauer 2012 Equity BN 2 0.33 4.93 267 7 3 
Füllbrunn/Neugebauer 2012 Equity BN 3 0.33 82.97 1345 12 2 
Füllbrunn/Neugebauer 2012 Equity BN 4 0.22 92.50 1508 11 3 
Füllbrunn/Neugebauer/Nicklisch 2012 Pilot SSW 1 0.44 34.40 1176 8 6 
Füllbrunn/Neugebauer/Nicklisch 2012 Pilot SSW 2 0.00 142.00 2130 15 0 
Füllbrunn/Neugebauer/Nicklisch 2012 Pilot SSW 3 0.44 67.77 1087 13 2 
Cheung/Palan 2011 1 - Individuals 0.33 105.00 2316 11 4 
Cheung/Palan 2011 5 - Individuals 0.44 47.27 967 12 3 
Cheung/Palan 2011 6 - Individuals 0.78 -41.20 900 8 7 
Cheung/Palan 2011 7 - Individuals 0.22 29.87 608 12 3 
Cheung/Hedegaard/Palan 2011 36-USB 0.70 -59.50 0 0 15 
Cheung/Hedegaard/Palan 2011 37-USB 0.70 78.77 1384 11 4 
Cheung/Hedegaard/Palan 2011 38-USB 0.70 -12.53 128 9 6 
Cheung/Hedegaard/Palan 2011 39-USB 0.70 18.30 522 9 4 
Cheung/Hedegaard/Palan 2011 40-USB 0.60 -100.80 225 4 11 
Cheung/Hedegaard/Palan 2011 41-USB 0.40 -21.03 117 4 5 
Haruvy/Noussair/Powell 2011 57 0.38 153.13 3263 11 4 
Haruvy/Noussair/Powell 2011 58 0.56 -125.23 13 2 13 
Haruvy/Noussair/Powell 2011 62 0.56 33.80 886 11 4 
Haruvy/Noussair/Powell 2011 63 0.56 19.57 1426 6 6 
Haruvy/Noussair/Powell 2011 64 0.44 57.50 1087 11 4 
Haruvy/Noussair/Powell 2011 56 0.63 -60.47 8 1 10 
Powell 2011 1 0.56 -12.30 79 6 5 
Powell 2011 2 0.56 -3.17 751 11 4 
Powell 2011 3 0.25 175.73 2636 15 0 
Powell 2011 4 0.22 4.63 156 4 3 
Powell 2011 5 0.89 26.60 606 10 3 
Powell 2011 6 0.29 -87.40 0 0 15 
Powell 2011 7 0.33 69.67 1108 11 2 
Powell 2011 8 0.67 -29.50 9 2 7 
Powell 2011 9 0.33 29.17 557 10 2 
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Appendix	  II:	  Instructions	  for	  market	  experiment	  
1.	  General	  Instructions	  
This	   is	  an	  experiment	   in	  the	  economics	  of	  market	  decision	  making.	   If	  you	  follow	  the	   instructions	  and	  make	  good	  
decisions,	  you	  might	  earn	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  money,	  which	  will	  be	  paid	   to	  you	   in	  cash	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  
experiment.	  The	  experiment	  will	  consist	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  trading	  periods	  in	  which	  you	  will	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
buy	  and	  sell	  shares.	  Money	  in	  this	  experiment	  is	  expressed	  in	  tokens	  (100	  tokens	  =	  1	  Dollar).	  	  
2.	  How	  To	  Use	  The	  Computerized	  Market.	  	  
The	  goods	  that	  can	  be	  bought	  and	  sold	  in	  the	  market	  are	  called	  Shares.	  On	  the	  top	  panel	  of	  your	  computer	  screen	  
you	  can	  see	  the	  Money	  you	  have	  available	  to	  buy	  shares	  and	  the	  number	  of	  shares	  you	  currently	  have.	  	  
If	  you	  would	   like	   to	  offer	   to	  sell	  a	  share,	  use	   the	  text	  area	  entitled	  “Enter	  Ask	  price”.	   	   In	   that	   text	  area	  you	  can	  
enter	  the	  price	  at	  which	  you	  are	  offering	  to	  sell	  a	  share,	  and	  then	  select	  “Submit	  Ask	  Price”.	  Please	  do	  so	  now.	  You	  
will	  notice	  that	  9	  numbers,	  one	  submitted	  by	  each	  participant,	  now	  appear	  in	  the	  column	  entitled	  “Ask	  Price”.	  The	  
lowest	  ask	  price	  will	  always	  be	  on	  the	  top	  of	  that	  list	  and	  will	  be	  highlighted.	  If	  you	  press	  “BUY”,	  you	  will	  buy	  one	  
share	  for	  the	  lowest	  current	  ask	  price.	  You	  can	  also	  highlight	  one	  of	  the	  other	  prices	  if	  you	  wish	  to	  buy	  at	  a	  price	  
other	  than	  the	  lowest.	  
Please	  purchase	  a	  share	  now	  by	  highlighting	  a	  price	  and	  selecting	  “BUY”.	  Since	  each	  of	  you	  had	  put	  a	  share	  for	  sale	  
and	  attempted	  to	  buy	  a	  share,	  if	  all	  were	  successful,	  you	  all	  have	  the	  same	  number	  of	  shares	  you	  started	  out	  with.	  
This	  is	  because	  you	  bought	  one	  share	  and	  sold	  one	  share.	  
When	   you	   buy	   a	   share,	   your	  Money	   decreases	   by	   the	   price	   of	   the	   purchase,	   but	   	   your	   shares	   increase	   by	   one.	  
When	  you	  sell	  a	  share,	  your	  Money	  increases	  by	  the	  price	  of	  the	  sale,	  but	  your	  shares	  decrease	  by	  one.	  Purchase	  
prices	  are	  displayed	  in	  a	  table	  and	  in	  the	  graph	  on	  the	  top	  right	  part	  of	  the	  screen.	  	  
If	  you	  would	   like	   to	  offer	   to	  buy	  a	  share,	  use	   the	  text	  area	  entitled	  “Enter	  Bid	  price”.	   	   In	   that	   text	  area	  you	  can	  
enter	  the	  price	  at	  which	  you	  are	  offering	  to	  buy	  a	  share,	  and	  then	  select	  “Submit	  Bid	  Price”.	  Please	  do	  so	  now.	  You	  
will	  notice	  that	  9	  numbers,	  one	  submitted	  by	  each	  participant,	  now	  appear	  in	  the	  column	  entitled	  “Bid	  Price”.	  The	  
highest	  price	  will	  always	  be	  on	  the	  top	  of	  that	  list	  and	  will	  be	  highlighted.	  If	  you	  press	  “SELL”,	  you	  will	  sell	  one	  share	  
for	  the	  highest	  current	  bid	  price.	  You	  can	  also	  highlight	  one	  of	  the	  other	  prices	  if	  you	  wish	  to	  sell	  at	  a	  price	  other	  
than	  the	  highest.	  
Please	  sell	  a	  share	  now	  by	  highlighting	  a	  price	  and	  selecting	  “SELL”.	  Since	  each	  of	  you	  had	  put	  a	  share	  for	  purchase	  
and	  attempted	  to	  sell	  a	  share,	  if	  all	  were	  successful,	  you	  all	  have	  the	  same	  number	  of	  shares	  you	  started	  out	  with.	  
This	  is	  because	  you	  sold	  one	  share	  and	  bought	  one	  share.	  
You	  will	  now	  have	  a	  practice	  period.	  Your	  actions	  in	  the	  practice	  period	  do	  not	  count	  toward	  your	  earnings	  and	  do	  
not	  influence	  your	  position	  later	  in	  the	  experiment.	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  practice	  period	  is	  only	  to	  master	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
interface.	  Please	  be	  sure	  that	  you	  have	  successfully	  submitted	  bid	  prices	  and	  ask	  prices.	  Also	  be	  sure	  that	  you	  have	  
accepted	  both	  bid	  and	  ask	  prices.	  You	  are	  free	  to	  ask	  questions,	  by	  raising	  your	  hand,	  during	  the	  practice	  period.	  
On	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  you	  have	  one	  price	  diagram	  showing	  this	  period’s	  recent	  purchase	  prices	  (the	  same	  in	  the	  
“Purchase	  Price”	   list).	   	  On	  the	  horizontal	  axis	  will	  be	  the	  number	  of	  shares	  traded,	  and	  on	  the	  vertical	  axis	   is	  the	  
price	  paid	   for	   that	  particular	  share.	   	   	  You	  will	  also	  see	  a	  graph	  on	  the	  historical	  performance	  of	   the	  experiment,	  
where	   the	  blue	  dots	   indicate	   the	  maximum	  price	  a	   share	  was	   traded	   in	   that	  period,	   the	  black	  dots	   indicate	   the	  
average	  price,	  and	  the	  red	  dots	  indicate	  the	  minimum	  price	  3.	  Specific	  Instructions	  for	  this	  experiment	  
The	  experiment	  will	  consist	  of	  15	  trading	  periods.	  In	  each	  period,	  there	  will	  be	  a	  market	  open	  for	  240	  seconds,	  in	  
which	  you	  may	  buy	  and	  sell	  shares.	  Shares	  are	  assets	  with	  a	  life	  of	  15	  periods,	  and	  your	  inventory	  of	  shares	  carries	  
over	  from	  one	  trading	  period	  to	  the	  next.	  You	  may	  receive	  dividends	  for	  each	  share	  in	  your	  inventory	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
each	  of	  the	  15	  trading	  periods.	  
At	   the	  end	  of	  each	   trading	  period,	   including	  period	  15	   the	  computer	   randomly	  draws	  a	  dividend	   for	   the	  period.	  
Each	  period,	  each	  share	  you	  hold	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period:	  
-­‐	  earns	  you	  a	  dividend	  of	  0	  tokens	  with	  a	  probability	  of	  25%	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-­‐	  earns	  you	  a	  dividend	  of	  8	  tokens	  with	  a	  probability	  of	  25%	  	  
-­‐	  earns	  you	  a	  dividend	  of	  28	  tokens	  with	  a	  probability	  of	  25%	  	  
-­‐	  earns	  you	  a	  dividend	  of	  60	  tokens	  with	  a	  probability	  of	  25%	  	  
Each	  of	  the	  four	  numbers	  is	  equally	  likely.	  The	  average	  dividend	  in	  each	  period	  is	  24.	  The	  dividend	  is	  added	  to	  your	  
cash	  balance	  automatically.	  After	   the	  dividend	   is	  paid	  at	   the	  end	  of	  period	  15,	   there	  will	  be	  no	   further	  earnings	  
possible	  from	  shares.	  
4.	  Average	  Holding	  Value	  Table	  
You	  can	  use	  the	  following	  table	  to	  help	  you	  make	  decisions.	  	  
Ending	  Period	   Current	  Period	  
Number	  of	  
Holding	  
Periods	  
×	   Average	  Dividend	  per	  
Period	  
=	   Average	  Holding	  Value	  per	  Share	  in	  
Inventory	  
15	   1	   15	   ×	   24	   =	   360	  
15	   2	   14	   ×	   24	   =	   336	  
15	   3	   13	   ×	   24	   =	   312	  
15	   4	   12	   ×	   24	   =	   288	  
15	   5	   11	   ×	   24	   =	   264	  
15	   6	   10	   ×	   24	   =	   240	  
15	   7	   9	   ×	   24	   =	   216	  
15	   8	   8	   ×	   24	   =	   192	  
15	   9	   7	   ×	   24	   =	   168	  
15	   10	   6	   ×	   24	   =	   144	  
15	   11	   5	   ×	   24	   =	   120	  
15	   12	   4	   ×	   24	   =	   96	  
15	   13	   3	   ×	   24	   =	   72	  
15	   14	   2	   ×	   24	   =	   48	  
15	   15	   1	   ×	   24	   =	   24	  
	  
There	  are	  5	  columns	  in	  the	  table.	  The	  first	  column,	  labeled	  Ending	  Period,	  indicates	  the	  last	  trading	  period	  of	  the	  
experiment.	   The	   second	   column,	   labeled	  Current	   Period,	   indicates	   the	  period	  during	  which	   the	   average	  holding	  
value	   is	   being	   calculated.	   The	   third	   column	   gives	   the	   number	   of	   holding	   periods	   from	   the	  period	   in	   the	   second	  
column	   until	   the	   end	   of	   the	   experiment.	   The	   fourth	   column,	   labeled	   Average	   Dividend	   per	   Period,	   gives	   the	  
average	  amount	   that	   the	  dividend	  will	  be	   in	  each	  period	   for	  each	  unit	  held	   in	  your	   inventory.	  The	   fifth	   column,	  
labeled	  Average	  Holding	  Value	  Per	  Unit	  of	  Inventory,	  gives	  the	  average	  value	  for	  each	  unit	  held	  in	  your	  inventory	  
from	  now	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  That	  is,	  for	  each	  unit	  you	  hold	  in	  your	  inventory	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  
the	  experiment,	  you	  will	  earn	  on	  average	  the	  amount	  listed	  in	  column	  5.	  	  
Suppose	  for	  example	  that	  there	  are	  7	  periods	  remaining.	  Since	  the	  dividend	  on	  a	  Share	  has	  a	  25%	  chance	  of	  being	  
0,	  a	  25%	  chance	  of	  being	  8,	  a	  25%	  chance	  of	  being	  28	  and	  a	  25%	  chance	  of	  being	  60	  in	  any	  period,	  the	  dividend	  is	  
on	  average	  24	  per	  period	  for	  each	  Share.	  If	  you	  hold	  a	  Share	  for	  7	  periods,	  the	  total	  dividend	  for	  the	  Share	  over	  the	  
7	  periods	  is	  on	  average	  7*24	  =	  168.	  Therefore,	  the	  total	  value	  of	  holding	  a	  Share	  over	  the	  7	  periods	  is	  on	  average	  
168.	  
	  
6.	  Making	  Predictions	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  money	  you	  earn	  from	  dividends	  and	  trading,	  you	  can	  make	  money	  by	  accurately	  forecasting	  the	  
trading	  prices	  of	   all	   future	  periods.	   You	  will	   indicate	   your	   forecasts	  before	  each	  period	  begins	  on	   the	   computer	  
screen.	  
The	  cells	  correspond	  to	  the	  periods	  for	  which	  you	  have	  to	  make	  a	  forecast.	  Each	  input	  box	  is	  labeled	  with	  a	  period	  
number	  representing	  a	  period	  for	  which	  you	  need	  to	  make	  a	  forecast.	  The	  money	  you	  receive	  from	  your	  forecasts	  
will	  be	  calculated	  in	  the	  following	  manner	  
	  
Accuracy	   Your	  Earnings	  
Within	  10%	  of	  actual	  price	   5	  tokens	  
Within	  25%	  of	  actual	  price	   2	  tokens	  
Within	  50%	  of	  actual	  price	   1	  token	  
	  
You	  may	  earn	  money	  on	  each	  and	  every	  forecast.	  The	  accuracy	  of	  each	  forecast	  will	  be	  evaluated	  separately.	  For	  
example,	  for	  period	  2,	  your	  forecast	  of	  the	  period	  2	  trading	  price	  that	  you	  made	  prior	  to	  period	  1	  and	  your	  forecast	  
of	   period	   2	   trading	   price	   that	   you	   made	   prior	   to	   period	   2	   will	   be	   evaluated	   separately	   from	   each	   other.	   For	  
example,	  if	  both	  fall	  within	  10%	  of	  the	  actual	  price	  in	  period	  2,	  you	  will	  earn	  2*5	  tokens	  =	  10	  tokens.	  If	  exactly	  one	  
of	  the	  two	  predictions	  falls	  within	  10%	  of	  the	  actual	  price	  and	  the	  other	  falls	  within	  25%	  but	  not	  10%	  you	  will	  earn	  
5	  tokens	  +	  2	  tokens	  =	  7	  tokens.	  
7.	  Your	  Earnings	  
Your	  earnings	  for	  the	  entire	  experiment	  will	  equal	  the	  amount	  of	  cash	  that	  you	  have	  at	  the	  end	  of	  period	  15,	  after	  
the	  last	  dividend	  has	  been	  paid,	  plus	  the	  $5	  you	  receive	  for	  participating.	  The	  amount	  of	  cash	  you	  will	  have	  is	  equal	  
to:	  	  
	  
Money	  you	  have	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  experiment	  
+Dividends	  you	  receive	  
+Money	  received	  from	  sales	  of	  shares	  
-­‐Money	  spent	  on	  purchases	  of	  shares	  
+Earnings	  from	  all	  forecasts	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Appendix	  III:	  Instructions	  for	  Gamble	  Choice	  Task  
 
Directions:  In this game, you have a chance to earn money.  Your earnings will depend on what you do, 
what others do, and chance, as explained below.  When this game is completed, you will be paid the 
amount you earn in this game.  Note: the dollar values in the experiment are measured in US dollars. 
 
In this game, you choose One from six possible options.  Once you choose an option, a six-sided die will 
be rolled to determine whether you receive payment A or payment B.  If a 1, 2, or 3 is rolled you receive 
payment A; if a 4, 5, or 6 is rolled you receive payment B.  You only play the game once.  
 
Option Payment A Payment B 
1 $12.00 $12.00 
   
2 $8.00 $20.00 
    
3 $4.00 $28.00 
    
4 $0.00 $36.00 
    
5 -$4.00 $44.00 
   
6 -$8.00 $48.00 
 
Examples:   
If you choose option 1:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you earn $12.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 6, you earn $12.00. 
If you choose option 2:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you earn $8.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 6, you earn $20.00. 
If you choose option 3:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you earn $4.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 6, you earn $28.00. 
If you choose option 4:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you earn $0.00; if you roll 4, 5, or 6, you earn $36.00. 
If you choose option 5:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you lose $4.00 (taken from your show up fee); if you roll 4, 5, or 6, you 
earn $44.00. 
If you choose option 6:  If you roll 1, 2, or 3 you lose $8.00 (taken from your show up fee); if you roll 4, 5, or 6, you 
earn $48.00. 
Decision: 
When you are ready please circle the option (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6) that you prefer.  Remember, there are no right or 
wrong answers, you should just choose the option that you like best.  
 
